Armed Conflict, Nepal Police, and the Transition Justice Process

The primary objective of the transitional justice process is to reinstate sustainable peace by acknowledging the administrative status of the opposing parties involved in the decade-long armed conflict and subsequent peace process and to achieve the nation’s goals of development and prosperity based on that reality. It should strive to address the wounds of pain and suffering inflicted on society, not through oblivion but through continuous awareness and acknowledgment, fostering forgiveness instead of a spirit of revenge. Additionally, rather than focusing solely on punishment, it should emphasize humane treatment toward all, ensuring no party faces cruel or unjust penalties. Healing with equality and fairness for all parties is a fundamental aspect of the transitional justice process. Like other conflicts worldwide, the events and processes of Nepal’s decade-long conflict are unique. It does not exactly align with the disputes of any other nation. Similarly, its post-conflict situation and peace process are also distinct and do not correspond to the conflict resolution of any other country. Therefore, Nepal’s peace process could also be unique. After World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunal adopted a punitive approach against Germany after its defeat. Punishment alone cannot bring harmony between nations, and the belief that it guarantees lasting peace and prosperity is mistaken. Countries like South Africa, Chile, and Guatemala have shown that reaching the truth, where one side apologizes and the other forgives, can work. More recently, Colombia has also embraced reconciliation through truth-telling.

Since every conflict and post-conflict situation is different, the mistakes made in past conflicts must be addressed based on their specific characteristics, and peace should be restored through their resolution. The foundation of peace and reconciliation must be based on four principles: truth, justice, reparation, and ensuring that the conflict does not recur in the future. As a significant part of this process, it is relevant to discuss the background of the Nepal Police, which has been deployed by the state to play a frontline role in conflict resolution.

Background of Nepal Police

Before the formal establishment of a structured police force in 1914 by Chandra Shamsher, local village heads (often referred to as Kotwals) played roles in maintaining order, but their activities were typically influenced by political motives. They used titles such as Kotwal, Militia, and Ameen for local enforcement, which were not part of a formal police system but rather administrative and political tools for maintaining control over local populations. After the police regulation was introduced in 1914, formal police stations, posts, and checkposts were established in areas like Kathmandu Valley and Birgunj to organize police operations for peacekeeping and security duties. However, the police force was still heavily influenced by the political interests and direct orders of the Rana rulers, who controlled the state, often deploying police forces to serve their personal or political goals rather than purely to maintain law and order. After the end of the Rana regime in 1950, during the 1951 revolution, former fighters of the Liberation Army, along with some soldiers from the then Royal Nepali Army and former employees who had worked in similar roles to the police, were included in the establishment of the Police Headquarters, with the General of the then Royal Nepali Army appointed as the Inspector General of Police.

In 2012 B.S., the Nepal Police gained legal recognition with the promulgation of the Police Act, 2012, based on the Indian Police Act of 1861 and recommendations from the Police Reform Commission. However, influenced by the military background of the then Royal Nepalese Army and the colonial-era Indian Police Act, the police institution became guided by a regimental system. This approach prioritized the implementation of rulers’ orders and decisions over a service-oriented approach toward citizens. In this context, despite the police respectfully adapting to political changes over various periods and operating under new governance systems, the regimental mentality of implementing the orders and decisions of new rulers persisted. After the dissolution of the elected government in 1961 and the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal in 1963, Nepal Police was legally bound to follow the directives of the ruling class to ensure the stability and security of the partyless Panchayat system. During this period, due to the perception of those directly governing, Nepal Police could not gain the full trust of the general public due to its background as a liberation army. Furthermore, the necessary organizational and professional development of Nepal Police could not take place. Nepal Police was utilized to suppress political dissent, monitor the activities of opponents, gather intelligence, and make arrests. The institution was also shaped into an excessively submissive and obedient body to overcome the crisis of trust exhibited by the then-political system, focusing solely on the tasks assigned to it.

During the 1990 People’s Movement, Nepal Police faced widespread criticism due to its use of force while fulfilling its legal responsibilities to control the demonstrators. Despite these challenges, Nepal Police adapted to the changes and transformed in line with the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal, in 1991. Following the restoration of democracy, the newly elected government, without conducting any study or discussion, introduced a provision limiting the service tenure to 30 years. This led to the dismissal of the Inspector General of Police and many senior officers, marking the beginning of serious political interference in Nepal Police. The government established the Police Reform Suggestion Commission to fundamentally reform the police organization and make it democratic and accountable. However, the relevant agencies of the Nepal government have let the commission’s reports gather dust without prioritizing their implementation. Political interference in police operations has not only continued but has also intensified, sidelining operational autonomy and transparency. The removal of the Inspector General of Police highlighted direct political interference within both political circles and the police organization. Changes made to the Police Regulations, which invited political meddling, also initiated a process of interference through civil servants. Despite this, Nepal Police has consistently embraced every political transition and, even during periods of upheaval, fearlessly fulfilled its responsibilities assigned by the state. It has worked to maintain peace, order, and compliance with existing laws in the face of numerous challenges.

Maoist Revolt and Ground Situation

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal started with the idea of bringing social and economic change, fair distribution of resources, and establishing a communist state. It was based on the belief that political, social, and economic inequalities, exclusion, and obstacles to prosperity needed to be addressed. For this, the government’s use of the Narcotics Control Act, which affected their main source of income, led to the beginning of a violent rebellion under the leadership of the CPN (Maoist) in remote and isolated areas like Rolpa and Rukum. These areas, where communities did not even have easy access to state services, felt angered by the government’s actions. Furthermore, after the 1990 People’s Movement, the unnatural hope shown by citizens, the politicization of state mechanisms, the monopolistic control of rulers over state resources, corruption in services, impunity, mismanagement, and the insensitivity of political parties led to frustration and dissatisfaction among the people, which eventually got organized into a violent rebellion. The then Deuba government received a 40-point demand on 10 February 1996, with a warning to launch a movement if the demands were not fulfilled within a specified time frame. However, before the deadline ended, the rebels initiated the rebellion on 13 February 1996 by attacking police posts in Rolpa, Rukum, Gorkha, and Sindhuli, following the strategy prepared in 1986 and approved by the Gorkha Conference.

Government Policy in Armed Conflict

Ignoring the fact that previous rebellions, such as the Khampa uprising, were controlled using administration and military forces, and that other rebellions were also managed under the direct or indirect cover of the army, the government decided to deploy the Nepal Police against the armed Maoist conflict. This decision was made without modern weapons, resources, or specialized training, relying only on basic supplies like noodles and beaten rice in line with the long-term people’s war strategy. The Nepal Police, responsible for maintaining peace and order by collaborating with communities in crime control, crime investigation, and disaster management, was neither skilled nor trained to handle the guerrilla-style armed rebellion prepared by the Maoists for over 10 years. The police were not trained in human rights issues or the principles related to them. The Nepal Police lacked modern weapons, specialized methods and technologies for intelligence gathering, and adequate supplies. Having long experienced distrust from the palace, the police had developed a mindset of being deployed without sufficient resource management or trust-building. As a result, the Nepal Police were deployed to control the Maoist conflict in the same manner, following the government’s orders, with the same mindset. Deploying the army would incur significant costs and the burden of supplying resources. On one hand, there was a lack of easy communication and consensus between the palace and the government regarding the deployment of the army. On the other hand, the government found relief from the hassle of resource management by opting to deploy the police instead.

The Maoist rebels, trained in guerrilla warfare by foreign instructors, were initially partially successful in the conflict against the police during the first 7 years. However, when the overall efforts to control the conflict proved ineffective, the establishment of the Armed Police Force was initiated. Yet, for almost two years after its formation, the Armed Police Force was busy with further training. Later, as attacks and violence by the Maoist rebels increased, the government declared a state of emergency in 2002 and classified the rebels as terrorists, which led to the deployment of the army. After the deployment of the army, the policy of joint operations and actions under the unified command was adopted, with the Nepal Police and other government security forces operating under the command of the Nepali Army. Meanwhile, an ordinance to control terrorist and destructive activities was issued, and by it, security forces were deployed. Due to political instability, the changing governments failed to identify and analyze the problems. On one hand, there was a tendency to underestimate the rebels due to arrogance in power, and on the other, they refused to accept information regarding the rebels’ preparations and their power capabilities. They also failed to formulate a coordinated national policy to effectively utilize the elements of national power. Meanwhile, all political parties and even the palace, believing that their position would improve if the Maoist rebels weakened the power of other parties, adopted policies to establish and use relationships with the Maoist leaders according to their strategies. Therefore, the parties in the government relied solely on military measures without a coherent strategy for social, economic, and political participation. Apart from the palace, other political parties, instead of focusing on controlling the violent conflict, were preparing to deploy the army only after weakening the power of others, believing that if they could control the armed conflict through the Nepali Army, they could establish the fact that they alone were capable of protecting the citizens. From the beginning of the conflict until the decision to deploy the army in 2002, the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, and the National Investigation Department were directly involved in controlling the violent conflict. After the Maoists attacked the army’s Ghorahi barracks in Dang, looting a large quantity of weapons, ammunition, and supplies, and following the royal massacre, King Gyanendra, after assuming royal responsibilities, decided to deploy the army in 2002. In this way, the integrated security plan was implemented, and all security forces were deployed under the unified command of the Nepali Army to control the violent conflict. By the time this system was in place, the Maoist fighters had already started attacking the security forces with large and modern weapons.

The government of the time adopted a purely military strategy to control the Maoist violent insurgency, instead of addressing it as a political issue arising from underlying social problems. Rather than viewing it as a need for economic development, management of livelihoods, social transformation, and participatory improvements in living standards, the government chose to approach it solely through military means. Accordingly, based on decisions from central, regional, local, and district security committees, orders were sent from higher to lower levels within the police structure. After violent attacks by Maoists began targeting police posts in remote areas staffed with 4-5 officers equipped mainly with batons and other limited, outdated weapons and resources, the Nepal Police increased personnel to up to 10 officers in the first phase. This aimed to maintain these posts while continuing to provide services to the public. However, due to a lack of adequate facilities and logistical support, the necessary communication mechanisms could not be developed. Taking advantage of this, the Maoists targeted small and remote police posts, launching large-scale nighttime attacks. They killed the officers stationed at posts with a strength of 8-10 personnel, looted the available weapons, and strengthened their ranks. Similarly, incidents of ambushing officers and personnel who were on leave or off duty began to rise. The Maoists would set traps, detonate explosives, and kill them or abduct and execute them after identifying them as police officers on roads or trails. The lack of security and logistical support at small posts, combined with violent nighttime attacks and the absence of immediate reinforcements, significantly weakened the morale of the police personnel stationed in such areas. The lack of resources and the absence of assurance that additional support would be available from another unit or center when needed led to incidents of desertion from assigned posts, indiscipline, and a culture of defiance. Serving in remote posts for an extended period, with no communication with family, weakened their morale. Every night, they faced the risk of losing their lives to violent Maoist attacks, endured poor provisioning and harsh living conditions, and dealt with threats of abduction of their children and harm to their families in their home districts. The inability to receive immediate assistance during the night at their assigned locations caused severe mental stress, particularly among security forces, including Nepal Police personnel. Police who had witnessed attacks on other posts were suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Officers on leave faced threats of abduction, killing, beating, and so on. Their family members were also targeted, and subjected to kidnapping, violence, and even death threats. Families received pressure-filled letters urging officers to resign from the police service, which was often their only source of livelihood. This created an atmosphere of fear and forced many families to relocate for safety. In addition, after the government announced rewards through the media for bringing Maoist leaders dead or alive, putting a bounty on their heads, the number of casualties on both sides, security forces and Maoists, increased significantly. This escalation can be considered a consequence of the government’s strategic decision. In the 2000 general election, as security personnel were transferred from remote police posts to other locations for additional security, Maoists increased their violent attacks on these posts. As a result, police posts and units had to vacate their premises during the night and return only in the morning. This situation heightened the sense of insecurity among the general public. The negative impact on civilians grew, and this state of affairs persisted until the tenure of the unified security forces and the end of the conflict.

The Emergence of Transitional Justice Processes

The Nepal Police has suffered the most damage among the country’s security forces during the conflict. A total of 1,486 police officers sacrificed their lives during the decade-long armed conflict, while 15 police officers remain missing to this day. Of the 2,397 police officers injured, 1,448 are forced to live with disabilities. In the transitional justice process, the reality created by the strategies developed through the consensus and active participation of the state, various political parties, and the palace during the conflict must be acknowledged. Since the transitional justice process is a procedure driven by political consensus, all parties need to participate to achieve its completion. Similarly, the matter of truth revelation and justice followed by reparation should ensure that victims who lost their lives, were abducted, became disabled, or were forcibly displaced, along with their families, receive reparation from the state based on the principles of uniformity and equality under the state’s one-door system. If reparations are distributed in a way that leads to favoritism, there is a risk of marginalizing the victim families of security forces. Therefore, it would be appropriate to provide reparations based on equality under the state’s one-door system. Another crucial aspect of the transitional justice process is ensuring that the conditions of the conflict do not recur. If there is a possibility of such a rebellion occurring in the future, the past situation mustn’t repeat. The response of the security forces should be based on pure professionalism, rather than being driven by impulsiveness or excessive enthusiasm. To achieve this, it is necessary to analyze the weaknesses and strengths of the security forces, particularly the police, and implement institutional reforms. Indeed, the role played by the Nepal Police in maintaining peace and security in the country is exemplary. However, there is a need to embrace a proper theoretical transformation of the Nepal Police by changing its legal framework, training, working style, and even its past regimental structure. Going forward, the Nepal Police must rise above traditional security thinking and prioritize the importance of human security, integrating it into their approach for the future. The person leading the transitional justice process should not be a member of any particular party or its affiliates, but rather a highly respected individual who is acceptable to Nepali society, similar to figures in South Africa or Colombia. The focus should not solely be on portraying security forces as perpetrators while neglecting the aspect of national and organizational accountability. Emphasis should not only be placed on individual accountability, but a balanced approach is necessary to address both organizational and personal responsibilities. If we proceed with the transitional justice process based on the mindset of simply taking action to prove ourselves as guardians of national and international peace, driven by political agreements and compromises, it will undermine the fundamental principles of truth and reconciliation commissions. Such an approach would mock the very basis of these commissions and their mission to uncover the truth and promote genuine reconciliation. In the future, there is a risk of indifference within security forces and the creation of an environment that could lead to another conflict. At that time, security personnel, following the state’s directives, were willing to sacrifice their lives, even when sent with less powerful weapons than the warring Maoists. Given this context, arrangements for truth revelation, justice, and reparation must be made. Furthermore, such actions and reactions in the conflict should be based on professionalism rather than biases or retaliatory actions, which would be in the best interest of the nation.

The violent conflict in Nepal was resolved through dialogue without a clear victory or defeat. Many lives were lost, numerous livelihoods were disrupted, many people were displaced, and countless individuals are now compelled to live with permanent psychological scars. There is a common desire that no one should have to endure such suffering again. In summary, the conflict was a national tragedy that impacted everyone. The transitional justice process should not be used as a tool for vengeance but rather embraced as a means to unite all of us. Nepal has already embraced the principle of coexistence, demonstrating an exemplary model of reconciliation at both local and national levels. Our society has shown extraordinary generosity and goodwill, even towards those involved in the conflict, moving forward with respect and dignity. In this context, the transitional justice process should be utilized as a tool to ensure a path toward reconciliation, sustainable peace, and a brighter future for national prosperity. Nepal’s peace process has its unique characteristics, and the societal and contextual standards are distinct to the nation. Therefore, the transitional justice process must also be adopted in alignment with the Nepali context and perspective. If this process is carried out within the framework of international obligations while remaining free from external influences, it will set a remarkable global example for post-conflict peacebuilding, ensuring justice, mutual tolerance, and reconciliation.

(Author: Former Inspector General of Nepal Police)