1. Introduction
The purpose of integration and rehabilitation of the combatants is to ensure security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can gain momentum faster. Integration and rehabilitation of the combatants of the maoist army is a multidimensional process. It has political, security, military, socio-economic and humanitarian dimensions. The success and failure of integration and reintegration programs depends upon the joint efforts of politicians, key stake holders of peace process, individuals, families and communities2. This is the first step in the transition form conflict to peace. To get success in this issue social and cultural capital should be taken into account. At the same time this is the phase for right-sizing of the armed forces and redistribution to human security areas i.e. health, education and environmental security downscaling from defense and other core security areas. Integration and rehabilitation has short term, medium and long term goals and implications. It is helpful to establish peace, security and stability in short term. Medium term is an extensive and expensive process. Taking some of the combatants into the security forces or particularly into the military sector reduces the problem. However, some view that this act of allowing entry into the military sector should be a long-term solution as most countries need to reduce the overall size of their military after war3. And, achieving sustained socio-economic balance for the stabilization of community should be the long term goal of reintegration and rehabilitation.
2. Linking DDR and SSR
In principle, international practices in this issue of reintegration and rehabilitation are not free from practical problems. Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) formulations have been developed to express a developmental approach, to advance a secure and firm environment enabling recovery, peace-building and development enthusiastically. DDR focuses on specific target groups especially putting the ex-combatants and their dependents at the center and aims to take opportunities for their orderly integration into agreed future defense forces for their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into peaceful civilian roles. SSR focuses on reforming the security system and its component parts to promote the prospects for effective, legitimate and accountable provision of justice and security services in the country as it emerges form conflict4. Thus, although they have distinctive foci and approaches, the aims of SSR and DDR overlap in many key areas i.e. a) sustainable dismantlement of illegitimate or undesirable armed groups and command structure b) appropriate resizing and restructuring of defense forces c) addressing the security and other needs of ex-combatants and associated vulnerable groups, as well as recipient communities as part of wider peace and security building, and d) military and defense reform. Still, there are many challenges and priorities of coordinating short and long term processes and objectives5.
International standards and good practice guidelines for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) have become relatively highly elaborated in recent years6. In many cases DDR was carried out in a fractured way, it lacked adequate coordination among the UN peacekeeping mission, agencies, programs and funds and was compromised by poor planning and support. Later, Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standard (IDDRS) was developed by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IWAG-DDR) during 2004-067. The debate on DDR and its end goals have advanced significantly in recent years, through process and programs such as the UN led IDDRS, the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) and the Multi-donor Reintegration Program (MDRP). This gives an understanding that DDR is political, social and economic process that has long term development implications. This has to be sustainable rather than simply as explicitly military activity with a primary focus on short term stability and security8.
During the early phase of integration and reintegration DDR programs were extremely vague concepts and, in the past, UN mandates on these processes were equally vague. So, these programs were often carried out in a disjointed and disintegrated way due to poor coordination, planning, support, and sometimes due to competition among peacekeeping operations, agencies, funds and programs. As a result, national and international efforts to establish security were not adequately supported thereby weakening the chances of a successful peace process. The Brahimi Report of August 2000 stresses the importance of UN agencies, funds and programs in the framework of UN peace operations all working towards the same goal9.
In Nepal both the works- integration and reintegration of ex-combatants and the democratization of Nepal Army, as mentioned in the Interim Constitution, must be seen as a part of broader security sector reform (SSR). Also, this must be seen as a de-militarization of the Nepali society because UCPN (Maoist) has set the instance of armed struggle and has made it realize, though it is not correct, that only the violent means can change the political course. Following this many armed groups are mushrooming in eastern Tarai and eastern and mid-hill regions. At the same time, the discourse of inclusive institutions is around so the security forces can take this as an advantage to build an institution of national spirit.
3. Constitutional Provisions and Political Agreements
Seeking international assistance, two letters, one from the government of Nepal and another from CPN (Maoist), have been sent to the UN. Both the letters request for UN assistance in five areas, in particular, for the management of arms and armed personnel. There had reached an agreement among the parties to seek UN assistance in “the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides”, deploy qualified civilian personnel to monitor and verify the confinement of CPN-M combatants and their weapons in designated cantonments. It was also agreed that the modalities for all arrangements, including of arms and ammunitions, would be worked out among the parties and the UN10.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on November 21, 2006 became the base for the integration and rehabilitation and it was agreed that the Interim Council of Ministers was to form a special committee in order to supervise (inspection or management or monitor), integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist combatants11.
Other Agreements
Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) of December 8, 2006 and its point 4.1.3 agreed that all the Maoist army combatants would be registered at the main cantonment sites. This registration would include the provision of age, name, rank, responsibilities within unit/formations, date of entry into service and would provide the basis for a complete list of personnel. Only those individuals who were members of the Maoist army before 25 May 2006 were to be eligible to be cantoned. Upon registration, Maoist army combatants, if found to be born after 25 May 1988, were to have been honorably and automatically discharged. Only those Maoist army combatants who were properly registered at cantonment sites were to be eligible for possible integration into the security forces fulfilling the standard norms. Any discharged personnel were to be ineligible for possible integration. And, it was agreed that eligiblility for integration into the security forces would be determined by a special committee as agreed in the CPA. This integration process was supposed to be determined in subsequent agreement with the parties12.
Point 2.2.3 of the agreement reached among the Seven Parties on 25 April, 2008 with regards to those verified Maoist combatants’ integration has stated to make a provision whereby only those duly registered at the temporary cantonments mentioned in Point 4.1.3 of the AMMAA, signed between the Government of Nepal and CPN (Maoist) and witnessed by the United Nations, will be deemed eligible for possible integration with the security bodies after fulfilling the standard requirements.
The verified combatants of the Maoist army were also to be offered a choice between an economic package and various other alternatives for rehabilitation13.
Understanding among Political Parties on 24th June as to amending the Interim Constitution and promoting peace process also agreed to form a Special Committee and it was stated that a special committee having the representation of main political parties in the Constitution Assembly would be formed and for this purpose Article 146 of the Interim Constitution will be amended.
It was also agreed that integration and rehabilitation process of verified Maoist army combatants would be completed in the maximum six months’ limit. For this purpose, special committee was to be formed by representatives of major political parities in the Constituent Assembly (CA), as directed by the Article 146 of the Interim Constitution. A technical committee of experts under this special committee was also provisioned. Special committee was supposed to be created and was to start its work within 15 days of the formation of cabinet. Government was not to take any responsibility of the combatants after six months who couldnt be integrated despite their verified status14.
4. International Experiences and Nepali Model
Integration and reintegration is complex combination of political and technical processes. Both are highly politically sensitive in any given circumstances and key local stakeholders must be aware of this. In highly politicized post-conflict contexts, it often becomes important to find ways by discussing on the support planning and implementation of both integration and reintegration. They also involve substantial technical complexities and procedures.
Globally, 45 integration programs have been implemented during 1945 to 2004, where 23 were in Africa. In all these programs UN had instrumental roles despite the fact that the results were not encouraging in many. Former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam etc transformed rebellion army into the national army after taking over power by communist party. Some African countries have adopted group integration and that helped to make national army inclusive. But, most of the post-conflict countries introduced individual entry into the security forces fulfilling existing norms and practices15. At the same time, some countries have made flexible standard norms.
a) Integration
Integration means that individuals are brought into the (new) military or security forces in positions similar to the ones they occupied in prior organizations which were in combat with their own16 or with adjustment in the ranks. In Nepali context integration is admission of Maoist Army combatants into the national security organizations. The term is understood to mean a process of integration of qualified Maoist army combatants into security sector components such as Nepal Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and National Intelligence Department and possibly newly proposed security bodies, if once decided at political level or at the Special Committee. But, till date Maoist combatants are under the chain of command of the UCPN (Maoist).
Constituent Assembly’s tenure has been extended by one year after its two years’ ordinary term was completed on 28 May, 2010, however, cross party negotiations, especially among the major three parties- the UCPN (Maoist), the NC and the UML, could not reach to any conclusion. The differences among the Maoist and other parties lie in three areas: the number of combatants to be integrated into the security forces; the modality of integration either they will follow normal standard of security forces or create new norms dealing as special case and the rehabilitation package that should be offered to the combatants.
Arguments and counterarguments about integration and reintegration were there and are still going on among the parties highlighting several complexities of the integration process. Integration now seems as the most challenging step of peace process in Nepal. There are four schools of thought on integration of Maoist combatants into the security forces. First, the UCPN (Maoist) is in favor of formation of new national army after integration of their Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in Nepal Army. Maoists have claimed many times that they are ready to introduce new security structure like Border Security Force or Industrial Security Force which can function as para-military structure. The party believes that the most practical option is to make national security policy and integrate both the armies in Nepali context and to form a national army. India- China relation is developing from new perspective and both are nuclear power. We are not preparing for any kind of conventional or direct war with any of them. So, the number of future Nepal Army should be limited to 30,00017.
Secondly, the Nepali Congress, especially a section in the party, is hesitant to integrate Maoist combatants into Nepal Army and other security forces. The third school of thought led by the CPN (UML) is in the middle of both the extremes and put a way forward as partial integration of Maoist combatants into Nepal Army18. Some of them can be integrated into the armed police force and others could be reintegrated into society. The UML’s emphasis is to be bound with agreements rather than describing agreement with party-cadre-sympathizers’ convenience with long term strategy. Fourth view is of the regional Tarai-Madhesh based political parties like Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Sadbhawana Party and Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party which are demanding for group entry of Madhesh-origin people into Nepal Army because of poor representation and also, somehow, as the part of management of the Maoist combatants.
Many say, integration should be based upon the ongoing discussion that each and every institution of the country should be inclusive in line with Kul Chandra Gautam that ‘some groups that have been historically marginalized and under-represented in the Nepal Army and other security organs are likely to be given preference over others in the larger national interest of Nepal’19. Women, Dalit, Madhesi and other historically under-represented sections of the Nepali society can be in this priority. Madhesi people are not represented in Nepal army in the past so this government must implement the previous agreement and introduce proportional and group entry for Madhesi community because the government has accepted that proportional, inclusive and group entry of Madhesi and other communities shall be ensured in order to give the Nepal army a national and inclusive character, as per the agreement between the government and United Democratic Madhesi Front20.
b) Reintegration or Rehabilitation
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and reintegrate into wider community- hopefully gaining sustainable and useful employment, income and social position21. This is seen as a reintegration of Maoist ex-combatants into the society as civilians with social respect. This will include vocational training, micro-enterprise support and education. Provision might also be arranged for selected Maoist army personnel to take up political or administrative function in their mother party UCPN (Maoist). It is appropriate to treat ex-combatants differently from other war affected groups, such as civil returnees, internally displaced persons and conflict affected families.
As per the agreement, the Maoist army combatants were kept in cantonments for six month but they have been staying for more than three years inside transitory sites. Ex-combatants can play a significant role in peace building in the post- conflict situation. Failure to do so will continue the violent activities because post-conflict context is fragile and failure to provide skill, training and employment opportunities to the combatants will develop frustration within them. So that there needs a special attention for the rehabilitation program. Rehabilitation is the most important part of the ongoing peace process. This package must be awarded equally, irrespective of the ranks or the years of service of the Maoist Combatants.
Incentives, skill generating trainings and programs of educational enhancement should be provided to the Maoist combatants while rehabilitating and the ones to be reintegrated and rehabilitated should be categorized as follows with the different types of programs and packages of rehabilitation.
a) Self-employment seekers.
b) Those who want rehabilitation willingly but seeking some skills /education from the state.
c) The above categories basically include those who want integration into security forces but fail to be integrated due to inability to meet the required norms or due to various other reasons.
d) Disabled combatants.
e) Lactating/pregnant female combatants who do not fall under the first two options.
f) Seriously ill combatants.
Maoist combatants that fall into the following categories must be discussed in the Special Committee.
a) Human Rights violators.
b) Deserters, those who left the existing security forces and joined UCPN (M).
c) Combatants willing to practice politics.
d) Those having criminal record and pending cases in the courts.
5. Rehabilitation Packages
A) Education-Formal and Informal
In this regard education can be offered to the combatants who want to go for education package, as day-scholar for primary, middle, secondary and higher secondary education in government schools and hostel facility can be provided if the desired type of education is not available in the neighborhood place of residence. Bridging courses can be provided for the ex-combatants who want to go to school or college education. If some can’t, for various reasons, attend school or college, can be offered informal or open school education package or private examinations system. The area of such formal and informal education can be like veterinary, teaching, forestry, computer, management and journalism etc.
B) Vocational Trainings
If some of the Maoist combatants want to go for specific vocational trainings, they can be offered one of the following trainings. Each combatant should be given stipend to meet the expenses for lodging, foods and the basic expenses related to education or training. After the completion of training each combatant must be provided with basic tools and the seed money to start business. These trainings can be offered in many fields once agreed at policy level. Skilled trainings should be offered in the areas like-welding, electric wiring, plumbing, brick-laying and carpentry, driving-light vehicles, cuisine, tailoring and mechanical repairs. In the medical field they can be offered trainings for lab technician in pathological laboratory, dental technician in laboratory, community medical assistant, community health workers, and maternity community health workers. Agro- based education like basic agricultural concepts and trainings for the production of off-seasonal vegetables, different kinds of fruits, seeds and cash crops can be offered to them. In the area of animal husbandry- cows/buffalos farming, poultry, goats or sheep farming, pig keeping, fishery, bee keeping, silkworm farming and butchery can be offered to the ex-combatants. In the hotel related area, house-keeping, bartending, hotel boy and chef/cooking options can be offered. Similarly, they can be offered trainings related with cottage and small industry and specific skills generating trainings to work as a barber, beautician, florist etc.
6. Discharge of Disqualified Ex-Combatants
Of the 4,008 Verified Late Recruits and Minors (VLRM) and disqualified Maoist combatants, 2,394 minors and late recruits were released from the temporary cantonments during the formal discharge process in January-February 2010. As per the tripartite agreements between the Nepal Government, United Nations, and CPN (Maoist) it was agreed that the disqualified ex-combatants and minors would be immediately discharged from the cantonments after the verification process, however, the discharging process completed three years after the verification process was completed in December 2007. Of the total discharged ex-combatants more than 1700 have contacted to the toll free number and have shown their interests in few areas of trainings offered to them.
7. Challenges
Maoists are claiming equal positions in all rank and files of the Nepal Army. In fact, they have trained them even during three years’ stay in cantonments. With these priorities worries of the non-Maoist parties in general are-
Ø Maoist party will try to integrate more numbers of their combatants than agreed upon among senior leaders of the parties.
Ø It may try to integrate more numbers of the combatants into Nepal army and might politicize the latter.
Ø It may use the uniform to freely intimidate the public if integrated into the Nepal Police.
Ø Security forces may face mutiny, insubordinations, disobedience, fight in line, loss of weapons and politicization activities.
Ø Maoist party may still retain its influence over the integrated forces.
Ø Maoist party may try to send as many officers as possible into security forces.
Ø Security forces may loose professionalism due to integration.
Ø Whereas, there are such worries with the Maoist side-
Ø Promises given to combatants may not be fulfilled and leadership will lose credibility.
Ø Combatants may not be fully integrated. They may be treated like second class citizen.
Ø Maoist party may be forced to accept the existing norms of security forces.
Ø Maoist party may loose its influence over the integrated combatants.
Ø Maoist party may feel that the combatants may be ill- treated by the security forces.
Ø If asked to accept the existing norms of security forces, the number for integration may drastically reduce.
8. Actors of the Integration and Rehabilitation
Major political parties, government, civil society and international community are the key actors to complete this process. In the post-conflict countries oft there are political and societal divisions, weak or damaged institutions and limited expertise. So, the national government institutions need to develop the capacity to assess opportunity and map accordingly and there needs involvement of the concerned ministry and commissions in overall process. Since the agreements related to integration are essentially political, it will be necessary for the political parties to forge consensus as to planning integration and reintegration.
9. Few Arrangements for Policy Making
a) Management Mechanism
Burgess highlighted that ‘one of the most significant factors in the success or failure of army integration was the management of the process. This is significantly enhanced if all parties are represented in a flexible and adoptable process’22. So the management mechanism is the first requirement of the process.
b) Inclusive Integration
Inclusive integration process that is planned and managed by bodies comprising representation of all parties to the conflict is more likely to be successful23. At the same time this process must be inclusive in terms of social and economic marginalization based on caste, region and gender. Underprivileged community like Dalit, Madhesi and women should be given priority while integrating. It will give more inclusive nature to security forces. Women participation in security forces will help to make Nepal’s security forces gender balanced and gender sensitive institutions. It’ll also help to enable Nepal to respond to UN Security Council resolution 1325, under which the UN is encouraging all Member States to provide more women officers in its peace-keeping missions.
c) Community Stabilization
Integration and reintegration process is not just about integration of ex-combatants and assisting them back into normal life24. It is crucial to know how communities deal with the ex-combatants and manage social and economic challenges and conflicts that may result form assisting them.
d) Role of Private Sector in Rehabilitation
For most entrepreneurs, job creation for ex-combatants is the first and foremost responsibility of the state as it was responsible for the insurgency. The state should identify economic sectors into which the ex-combatants can be adjusted. But, at the same time, the most affected area by the insurgency is private sector so they also should contribute for sustainable peace. The state should also work with the donors and should try to establish programs in which ex-combatants’ salaries are subsidized, partly as an incentive for private entrepreneurs to take them on board and help them train.
e) Active Monitoring and Evaluation
Good practice guidelines for the successful integration and rehabilitation program emphasize the importance of monitoring and evaluation of progress and program at milestone points or as they come to an end. Usual review of the program during the implementation is very much needed in order to identify and address emerging problems or opportunities in a timely way. ‘Monitoring is the process of regularly examining a project’s actual outputs and impacts during implementation’25.
10. Conclusions and Recommendations
It is clear form the above analysis that there are many important and potential issues that have to be taken into account by the policy makers in relation with combatants’ integration, reintegration and rehabilitation in Nepal. Some direct and indirect implications of integration and rehabilitation process will be seen in the general life of Nepali post- conflict society. At this stage there are opportunities for pooling resources, internationally and nationally, to mobilize national capacity with broader framework towards a profound management in post conflict context. This program will be the key mechanism for assisting in the return of ex-combatants to a civilian life and society. So, there is need of special attention and a focused program must be developed in relation with ex-combatants primarily because they pose the highest risk in destabilizing peace. Integration and Rehabilitation program, if rightly implemented, can be used to deliver visible peace dividends and sustainable peace. However, there hasnt been made any substantial progress in this core area of national problem.
Since this process is understood as complex, sensitive and vague issue, political leaderships must develop a coherent and flexible view to look at Maoist combatants. Whole international community is optimistic and ready to help to support integration and especially rehabilitation program so the model of integration and rehabilitation should be in line with internationally acclaimed principles of democracy, practices and the international human rights covenants and protocols.
End note
1. Dr. Bhatt is member of the Technical Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Army Combatants, formed under the Special Committee by Government of Nepal.
2. Duthie, R, Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration, Background Studies, Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006, p 41.
3. Licklider, Roy, Merging Militaries after Civil War: South Africa, Bosnia and a Preliminary Search for Theory, Massachusetts, 2008, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p280687_index.html, accessed on 23 May 2010.
4. Greene, Owen and Ryan, Simon, Linking and Coordinating DDR and SSR for Human Security after Conflict: Issues, Experience and Priorities, Saferworld and University of Bradford, 2008, p 11-12.
5. ibid.
6. Greene, Owen and Ryan, Simon, Linking and Coordinating DDR and SSR for Human Security after Conflict: Issues, Experience and Priorities, Saferworld and University of Bradford, 2008, p 1.
7. Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, UN, 2006, p 13-14.
8. Bell, Edward and Watson Charlotte, DDR: Supporting Security and Development, The EU’s added value, September 2006, International Alert, London, p. 3.
9. Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, UN, 2006, p 13-14. http://www.unddr.org
10. Collection of Understandings, Agreements and CPA. Government of Nepal, MoPR, Singhadarbar, Kathmandu, 2007, p 45.
11. The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007, including sixth amendment, Makalu Prakasan Griha, Kathmandu, 2007, p 86.
12. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007)) as amended by the first, second and third amendments, UNDP, Nepal, p 310.
13. Comprehensive Peace Accord, Understandings between Political Parties and related documents, Government of Nepal, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR), Singhadarbar, Kathmandu p. 97.
14. Ibid.
15. Wagle, Geja Sharma, Prospects and Challenges: Integration and Reintegration of Maoist Army, Paper presented at seminar organized by NIPS, Kathmandu, March 18, 2009, p 16.
16. Knight, Mark and Hendrickson, Dylan, Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Reform, Helpdesk Query, Commissioned by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, University of Birmingham, 2009, p 8.
17. 30,000 S